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Why Cooperate?
Ethical Analysis of InfoSec Vulnerability Disclosure
Mark-David McLaughlin
Cisco Systems/Bentley University, Waltham MA USA
Janis L. Gogan
Bentley University, Waltham MA USA
ABSTRACT
Vendors, security consultants and information security researchers seek guidance on if and when
to disclose information about specific software or hardware security vulnerabilities. We apply
Kantianism to argue that vendors and third parties (InfoSec researchers, consultants, and other
interested parties) have an ethical obligation to inform customers and business partners (such as
channel partners or providers of complementary products and services) about specific software
vulnerabilities (thus addressing if disclosure should occur). We apply Utilitarianism to address
the question of when disclosure should occur. By applying these two philosophical perspectives
we conclude that to maximize social welfare, vendors should release software fixes as soon as
possible, and third parties should adopt a coordinated disclosure policy to avoid placing
customers and business partners at unnecessary risk.

Keywords: Information Systems Security, Ethics, Vulnerability Disclosure, Kantianism,
Utilitarianism
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INTRODUCTION
Rarely is software released without defects. An information security (InfoSec) vulnerability is a
specific type of software defect that enables a malicious agent to undermine the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an IT product or service (device, database, system software, or
software application). After a vulnerability is identified in an IT product, customers and business
partners expect the vendor to produce a fix and inform the public about risks they will face if
they do not install it. If a vendor believes no one else has discovered the vulnerability as yet,
and/or that it has not yet been maliciously exploited by hackers, they may not feel moral pressure
to disclose it and provide a fix. Therefore, when and how to inform customers of InfoSec
vulnerabilities remains an open question. This paper addresses ethical considerations related to
the disclosure of InfoSec vulnerabilities in hardware and software.

Organizations that do not disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities place their customers at risk. Because
no centralized authority governs computer use, significant organizations’ vulnerability disclosure
policies and procedures vary, and different ethical codes have been adopted by different software
and equipment vendors, consultants, end users, and researchers (Leiwo and Heikkuri 1998).
Guidelines suggests that vulnerability disclosure policies should address vendor responsibility
(ownership and accountability of issues), morality (acting responsibly), trust (instill confidence),
and ethicality (acting in accordance with principles of right conduct) (Dhillon and Backhouse
2000). While prior studies have examined InfoSec vulnerability disclosure issues, to our
knowledge, no paper has done so through the lens of ethical theories. We fill that gap by drawing
on Kantianism and Utilitarianism to provide ethical guidance to the following research questions:
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RQ1a: Should organizations publicly disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities in their
hardware and software products and services?
RQ1b: If so, how soon should organizations disclose these InfoSec vulnerabilities?
RQ2a: Should third parties (customers, consultants, security researchers, etc.) who
become aware of previously-undisclosed nfoSec vulnerabilities publicly
disclose them?
RQ2b: If so, how soon should third parties disclose these InfoSec vulnerabilities?

INFOSEC VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: PRIOR RESEARCH
If a vendor chooses not to disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities lurking in their products, or not to fix
them, customers will come to distrust them. Responsible disclosure programs aim to disclose
vulnerabilities to “the appropriate people, at appropriate times, and through appropriate
channels” to minimize potential negative impacts to society (Cavusoglu et al. 2005). Yet, how
and when to disclose vulnerability information is not a straightforward decision. While public
disclosure increases awareness of a vulnerability (giving customers and business partners an
opportunity to install a fix or prepare for an attack), disclosure also increases the likelihood that
malicious agents will learn about the vulnerability and attempt to exploit it. Many vendors
reportedly release patches before it is socially optimal to do so (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan
2007), and simulations reveal that neither instant disclosure nor secrecy maximizes social
welfare (Arora et al. 2008). We further note that disclosure of a particular vulnerability does not
guarantee that all customers and partners will remediate it; some customers will not install a fix
due to various circumstances. They may have been unable to receive a vendor notification when
it was distributed, or may not have the expertise to perform the mitigation. Prior economic
models demonstrated that the risk to marginal customers (the edge case) increases when a
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vulnerability is announced, even though overall risk to average customers decreases (Choi and
Fershtman 2005).

When not legally obliged to reveal an InfoSec vulnerability, an organization may choose not to
disclose it. Given a choice, managers who only consider the immediate costs of disclosure might
choose not to disclose it (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2007). Managers have a responsibility to
‘do no harm’ by avoiding actions that place customers and partners at risk (De George 2008). A
customer or partner who is not aware of an InfoSec vulnerability will not know that a fix needs
to be installed, and those who become aware of a vulnerability may lack the influence or power
to correct the problem (Culnan and Williams 2009).

KANTIANISM AND UTILITARIANISM
In Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct, moral requirements are based on reason; an individual who
acts in a way contrary to reason is behaving immorally (Kant 1785). Kant’s Categorical
Imperative—the unconditional requirement for autonomous rational beings to respect others’
autonomy—dictates that morals are universal; they must be applied uniformly to all rational
agents in all situations, regardless of specific features of an individual or of a situation (Kant
would not be a fan of contingency theories). Building on the requirements that actions be based
on reason and morals universally applied, Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct further specifies that
an individual must not treat himself or other human beings solely as a means to an end; morality
requires us to respect humanity, treating it as an end in itself (Timmons 2012). It is, however,
acceptable to use another human as a means to an end, so long as the other party gives informed
consent (not consent based on deception or coercion). The principle of universalizability can be
applied to test if an action respects others or treats others as a means to an end.
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Table 1 compares Kantianism versus Utilitarianism, drawing on prior work by Timmons (2012).

Table 1

Comparison of Kantianism and Utilitarianism (Timmons, 2012)
Kantianism

Utilitarianism

Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct provides guidance for
judging whether an action is obligatory, wrong, or
optional (Timmons 2012):

Mill’s classical view of Utilitarianism provides guidance
based on the expected utility of a particular action, as
described by Timmons (2012):

An action A in circumstance C is obligatory if and only
if (and because) failing to perform A in C would (from
among the alternative actions open to one in C) fail to
respect humanity to a greater degree than would any
alternative action.

An action A is obligatory if and only if (and because) A
would produce a higher level of utility than would any
other alternative action that the agent could perform
instead.

An action A in C is wrong if and only if (and because)
performing A would fail to respect someone’s humanity
to a greater degree than would any other alternative
action open to one in C.

An action A is wrong if and only if (and because) A
would produce less utility than would some other
alternative action that the agent could perform instead.

An action A in C is optional if and only if (and because)
either (i) performing A would not fail to respect
someone’s humanity to a greater degree than would any
other alternative action open to the agent in C, or (ii)
neither performing A nor failing to perform A in C
would involve failing to respect humanity.

Utilitarianism is based on the idea that the consequences of an act determine if it was right or
wrong. Utilitarianism is generally implemented either by evaluating particular acts (act
utilitarianism) or analyzing codes of conduct (rule utilitarianism). Utilitarianism determines the
deontic status of an action according to the utility or total net intrinsic value of its consequences
(Mill 1861). To evaluate an action and determine the best course of action (priorities) one
compares the net value of expected outcomes versus expected outcomes from alternative actions;
the right action is that which yields the highest overall value (or lowest overall negative
outcome) to individuals. Although Utilitarianism has been criticized as a promoting a philosophy
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of “the ends justifies the means” (Mingers and Walsham 2010), it continues to exert wide
influence. For example, utilitarianism underlies the Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM) code of ethics (Walsham 1996), ethical analyses in medicine (Baker and McCullough
2007; Haynes 2002) and law (Posner 1979). Classical Utilitarianism is less sensitive to
fundamental rights and justice, which are central to Kant’s theories. By starting our analysis
through a Kantian lens, we avoid dilemmas in which the greatest good would result from
behavior that might otherwise be unethical.

VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: ANALYSIS THROUGH TWO LENSES
Here, we first answer RQ1a and RQ2a from a Kantian perspective. Then, in order to establish
rules of conduct for the timing of vendors’ vulnerability disclosures, we answer RQ1b and RQ2b
from the perspective of Utilitarianism. Each moral theory relies on different assumptions, as
described above. A two-part ethical analysis that starts with Kant avoids a situation in which we
would guide vendors to take actions which might yield greater good (optimal ends) yet entail
reprehensible actions (unethical means).

Kantian Analysis of Vulnerability Disclosure

In order to consider if a vendor or third party should publically disclose a vulnerability (RQ1a
and RQ2a), we evaluate vulnerability disclosure from the Kantian perspective. If a hardware or
software producer knows that an IT product contains a specific vulnerability and does not
disclose this to customers and business partners, the producer is purposely withholding vital
information that customers and partners need to make rational decisions about the product, as
well as to make decisions for protecting various information resources, human resources, and
other resources. Thus, the act of withholding this information disrespects customers’ and
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partners’ autonomy; they have been denied information needed to make rational decisions.
Vendors disclose information about vulnerabilities in their products so that customers and
business partners can remediate or mitigate the risks associated with a malicious agent exploiting
them. Open and transparent information about IT products respects users’ autonomy and
capacity for informed consent (Spinello 2010).

If a third party discovers the vulnerability, moral guidance is also universally applicable (per
Kant); the same logic that applies to a vendor applies to a third party. If a vendor has a moral
obligation to inform a customer or partner about InfoSec vulnerabilities in IT products and
services (RQ1a), then a third party has the same universally applied obligation (RQ2a).

Utilitarian Analysis of Vulnerability Disclosure Timing

In order to consider when an InfoSec vulnerability should be disclosed, we turn to Utilitarianism.
The goal of this second stage of evaluation is to identify timing choices that minimize the
aggregate risk to customers and partners. Figure 1 is a graphical model that represents risk
associated with a specific vulnerability over time. The risk associated with an unremediated (or
unmitigated) vulnerability is represented as r. Once customers and partners know about a
vulnerability, they can address it. Some customers rely on prepaid automated updates that
immediately fix software related to specific vulnerabilities. Others will not immediately fix their
software (mitigation will occur at some variable rate). Also, there is residual risk if a
vulnerability cannot be completely mitigated. Therefore, mitigated risk decreases toward a
minimum value at a rate of adoption. Our model labels this risk r* and it is represented by the
Mitigated Risk line. Before an InfoSec vulnerability is publicly disclosed, a vendor and its
customers and partners face the risk that a malicious agent will independently discover it. Prior
Proceedings of the Tenth Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Fort Worth, USA, 2015.
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research demonstrated this scenario, based on the density and cumulative number of
vulnerabilities in a software system and the rate of discovery (Alhazmi and Malaiya 2005;
Anderson 2002; Musa and Okumoto 1984; Rescorla 2005). We model discovery risk d(t) as a
linear function, indicating that this risk increases every day that third parties (whether malicious
agents or legitimate security researchers) continue to search for it. This is represented in the
model by the Actual Risk line.

Utilitarianism is concerned with the overall net value of an action; therefore, we depict aggregate
risk across a population of customers. In Figure 1, we graphically show that if a vulnerability is
known to a vendor but not known publicly, the vendor should wait to disclose it until the point in
time when mitigated risk is equal to the likelihood that the vulnerability will be independently
discovered. We label this point A on the model. At this point the risk r* equals d(t) and the risk
decreases as the vulnerability is mitigated through customers’ and partners’ remediation efforts.
However, when a vulnerability is known to the vendor but not disclosed to customers and
partners (at point B), the net risk for customers is higher than it would have been if the vendor
disclosed earlier. If the vulnerability is never disclosed and is not remediated, the risk level
remains at r which represents the probability of an attacker exploiting the vulnerability.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Risk of Vulnerability Disclosure Timelines

In Figure 1, the difference between r and r* represents the reduction of risk due to disclosure.
This risk may be immediately reduced through mechanisms such as automatic updates. Risk can
be further reduced as customers and partners continue to learn about the issue and take care of it
(such as by upgrading their software to a version where this vulnerability has already been fixed,
or investing in contingency plans for dealing with the consequences if an unfixed vulnerability is
exploited). Four different areas of Figure 2 (below) represent varied risk levels. The unshaded
upper left quadrant represents unrealized risk. The blue upper-right quadrant represents risk due
to non-optimal or late disclosure (vendor releases a fix after a malicious agent discovers it).
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Figure 2: Risk Quadrants of Modeled Risk Disclosure

The gray, bottom-left quadrant of Figure 2 depicts the case in which a vendor discloses the
vulnerability before its likely independent discovery by a malicious agent. Disclosure is morally
wrong in the gray and blue areas, since it would place the user population at higher risk (lower
utility) than the alternative act of non-disclosure. The yellow area represents the mitigated risk
that customers face due to their ongoing consumption of the product. Here, is where vendors
ought to disclose IT vulnerabilities.

DISCUSSION
Managers aim to make decisions that provide benefits to various stakeholders while remaining
ethical. Application of Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct reveals that IT product vendors must
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disclose information about known InfoSec vulnerabilities in their products and services, but it
does not readily address how quickly a vendor should disclose and remediate a vulnerability.
More empirical research and simulations are needed to quantify risks of undisclosed
vulnerabilities under different discovery models. Our model assumes managers and third parties
will immediately know when one or more malicious agents discover a particular vulnerability
(point A on Figures 1 and 2). Since information about malicious agents’ knowledge is not always
known, it follows that vendors should make every effort to fix and disclose vulnerabilities in a
timely fashion, and vendors should also take steps that aim to motivate customers to install each
fix. Our model also demonstrates that in order to minimize risk to a population of customers and
business partners, a third party should only be a first discloser if they can provide a complete fix
for the vulnerability. Previous studies reported that external pressure (in the form of third party
disclosures) may motivate organizations to provide timely fixes (Arora et al. 2010). If everyone
respects humanity as Kant proposed and everyone attempts to minimize the potential for
negative outcomes (per Utilitarianism), customers and partners would be better off. However, the
moral compass of managers and external parties doesn’t always point to true north. Therefore,
third parties who attempt to take the moral high ground regarding vulnerability disclosure must
work in good faith with one another to produce fixes, make them quickly available to customers
and business partners, communicate the necessary information to motivate customers to adopt
the fixes, and refrain from imposing authoritarian timelines. In essence, non-malicious third
parties and vendors should work together and adopt a policy of coordinated disclosure.
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